請問抗美援朝之後（1953-1956）的中蘇關係是怎樣的？

武子奇2022-03-20 21:44:59

大二我有門課“Russia， China and the US in the Cold War era“。以下是這門課的結課論文。寫的1956年這一年的諸多事件，尤其是波蘭和匈牙利的局勢混亂，對整個蘇聯勢力範圍的影響。其中中國的態度十分值得細讀。可以觀察到中蘇關係已經開始出現細微的裂痕，並逐步積累到1960s的關係破裂，

1956 is a significant year for the Soviet Union， witnessing the its Communist bloc that had emerged from the World War II was severely shaken by the internal crisis in satellite states Poland and， most significantly， Hungary， and the external challenges from its communist allies， China and North Korea。 In Stalinist period， bloc consolidation had been based on a combination of terror and strict adherence to Soviet model of political and economic development。［1］ With the death of Stalin in 1953 and the assumption of power by Khrushchev， a fresh approach to domestic issues and to the nature of Soviet control over its empire soon emerged。

1956年對蘇聯來說是重要的一年，它見證了二戰後共產主義集團受到衛星國波蘭和匈牙利境內危機的嚴重動搖，以及來自共產主義盟友中國和朝鮮的外部挑戰。在斯大林主義時期，集團的鞏固是建立在威權，和各國嚴格遵守蘇聯政治和經濟發展模式的基礎上的。［1］

隨著斯大林於1953年去世，赫魯曉夫掌權，蘇聯高層內部很快出現了一種對待國內事務和解讀蘇式控制的本質的新視角。

Khrushchev’s thaw since 1953 and more notably， his repudiation of Stalinism in his February 1956 ‘Secret Speech’ at the 20th CPSU Party congress unleashed the pent-up demand for reform in Eastern Europe and North Korea and offered China the opportunity to challenge the Soviet centrality in the international Communism movement。

赫魯曉夫自1953年以來的“解凍 ”（хрущёвская о́ттепель），尤其是，他在1956年2月蘇共第20屆代會上發表的“秘密演講”中對斯大林主義的批判，釋放了東歐和朝鮮被壓抑的改革需求，併為中國提供了國際共產主義運動中挑戰蘇聯中心地位的機會。

This essay argues that events during the mid-1950s generated a blow the Soviet Union which it had hardly recovered from； in fact， one could argue that after this period there was no longer a coherent ‘Communist world’。 Nonetheless， Soviet control over the Eastern bloc was maintained and a surface stability was secured。 Such situation lasted in Eastern Europe， though with occasional severe interruptions， for another three decades。 In contrast， the outcome of the 1956 crisis in North Korea was a personal victory for Kim II Song demonstrated by an abortive Sino-Soviet political intervention， and laid the political foundations for the creation of a distinctive Pyongyang brand of Stalinist state socialism。 The crisis also strengthened Chinese leadership’s ambition to shake the Soviets from the center of Communist world。 This mixture of strength and limits， constitutes the picture of the 1956 Soviet power。

本文認為，20世紀50年代中期的事件對蘇聯造成了打擊，蘇聯幾乎沒有從中恢復過來；事實上，有人可能會說，在這一時期之後，不再有一個緊密連貫的“共產主義世界”。儘管如此，蘇聯對東部集團的控制得以維持，並確保了地面的穩定。這種情況在東歐持續了30年，儘管偶爾會出現嚴重中斷。

相比之下，1956年朝鮮危機的結果是金氏個人的勝利，中蘇政治干預的失敗證明了這一點，併為建立一個獨特的斯大林式平壤翻版奠定了政治基礎。1956年的種種也增強了中國領導層將蘇聯從共產主義世界中心位置撼動移位的雄心。這種絕對力量和部分侷限的結合，構成了1956年蘇聯政權的圖景。

In the early 1950s prior to 1956， when communist rule seemed to be fragile and people suffering from intense Sovietization recalled a life before Stalinism， protests already arisen in Eastern bloc in demand of improvement on living and working conditions。 The death of Stalin in 1953 raised hope for a relief on tension caused by Stalinist reign。 The period between 1953 and 1955 had witnessed the uprisings in Czechoslovakia， East German， Hungary， Bulgaria， Romania and even the USSR itself which all easily be suppressed。［2］ Nonetheless， these uprisings had already implicated the uncertainties and dynamics in the early post-Stalin era， paving a way for the coming significant events of 1956 which put much more profound threat to the Soviet bloc。

1956年之前的20世紀50年代初，共產主義統治似乎很脆弱，飽受蘇聯化之苦的人們追憶起斯大林主義之前的生活。當時，東部地區已經出現了一些抗議活動，主要訴求是要求改善生活和工作條件。斯大林於1953年去世，這給緩解斯大林統治造成的高壓局勢帶來了希望。1953年至1955年期間，捷克斯洛伐克、東德、匈牙利、保加利亞、羅馬尼亞都發生了起義，這些起義都被輕鬆平復。［2］ 儘管如此，這些起義已經牽涉到後斯大林時代早期的不確定性和動態性，為1956年即將到來的重大事件鋪平了道路，這些事件對蘇聯集團構成了更為深遠的威脅。

At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the February 1956， Nikita Khrushchev who had emerged as Stalin’s successor， denounced Stalin’s ‘crimes and cult of personality’。［3］ Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin has its own significance by undermining the legitimacy of the Stalinist legacy。 It encouraged the question of the purpose of the achievements of that entire era， and more importantly， shook the current basis of Soviet political system who was firmly connected with that Stalinist period and the exercises of the cult of personality， and this challenge was particularly severe when it originated from the highest authority from the Communist camp， the party itself。［4］ Thus， Soviet power， at least the legitimacy of exercising it was limited through this self-destruction。

1956年2月，在蘇共第二十次代表大會上，斯大林的繼任者尼基塔·赫魯曉夫譴責了斯大林的“罪行和個人崇拜”。［3］ 赫魯曉夫對斯大林批評的政治意義重大，因為它破壞了斯大林主義遺產的合法性。它鼓勵了人們對整個斯大林時代成就的質疑，更重要的是，它動搖了與過去斯大林主義時期個人崇拜運動緊密相連的蘇聯現有政治制度基礎，而當這一挑戰竟源自共產內部陣營的最高權威自身時，這一挑戰變得尤其嚴峻。［4］ 因此，蘇聯的權力，至少是行使權力的合法性，因這種自我毀滅式的批評而受到限制。

Khrushchev’s thaw since 1953 and his repudiation of Stalinism served as catalyst for the crisis in Poland and then in Hungary。 In Poland， the liberalization from the top， as partly seen from the release of thousands of political prisoners， was accompanied by the rise of critical views from the bottom。［5］The Poznan uprising， on 28-29 June was at the beginning triggered by Polish government’s rejection on improving workers’ wages。 A demonstration evolved into large scale riots with more than half of Poznan population involved。 Though some evidence shows that Polish army were reluctant to fire on their own citizens， such resistance turned out to be futile， given the fact that the Soviet power dominated the Polish military establishment。［6］ The two-day clashes of protesters and Polish army left at least 74 dead and hundreds wounded， confirming the Soviet strength at the expense of Pole’s tragedy。［7］

赫魯曉夫自1953年以來的解凍，以及他對斯大林主義的否定，成為波蘭和匈牙利危機的催化劑。在波蘭，數千名政治犯獲釋，自上而下的自由化已明顯易感。與此同時伴隨著自下而上的對政治當局的批評。［5］ 6月28日至29日的波茲南起義最初是由波蘭拒絕提高工人工資引發的。一場示威演變成了大規模騷亂，超過一半的波茲南人口捲入其中。儘管一些證據表明波蘭軍隊不願意向本國公民開火，但鑑於蘇聯政權主導了波蘭軍隊，這種抵抗最終是徒勞的。［6］ 抗議者和波蘭軍隊的兩天衝突造成至少74人死亡，數百人受傷，以波蘭的悲劇為代價證實了蘇聯的力量。［7］

Four months later， Polish October witnessed the public support for the release of Wladyslaw Gomulka and his return to the Polish leadership。 Soviet concern that Gomulka might remove the core pro-Soviet member from Polish political center was strengthened by his insistence on the removal of Konstantin Rokossowski， Polish minister of defense installed by Moscow。 On 19 October， Khrushchev deployed a unit of Soviet tank troop to advance toward Warsaw slowly and later he also decided to send delegation to Warsaw to maintain the Soviet power sphere。 Yet Polish authorities insistence made the meeting with Soviet delegation ended without any agreement。 As situation escalated， on 22 October， more than 100000 pro-Gomulka Poles protested in Polish cities and the rally in Warsaw on 24 October gathered more than 500000 people。［8］

四個月後，波蘭的10月見證了公眾對釋放瓦迪斯勞·戈穆爾卡的呼籲，和對他重返波蘭領導層的支援。蘇聯擔心戈穆爾卡可能會從波蘭政治中心剔除親蘇派成員，這一擔憂因他堅持罷免莫斯科任命的波蘭國防部長康斯坦丁·羅科索夫斯基而得到加強。

10月19日，赫魯曉夫部署了一支蘇聯坦克部隊向華沙緩慢推進，後來他還決定派代表團前往華沙，以維持蘇聯的權力影響。然而，波蘭當局堅持認為，與蘇聯代表團的會晤沒有達成任何協議。隨著局勢升級，10月22日，10多萬親戈穆爾卡的波蘭人在波蘭城市舉行抗議，10月24日在華沙舉行的集會聚集了50多萬人。［8］

The emergence of crisis in Hungary on 23 October further perplexed the scenario。 For the Soviet Union， coping with two large-scale uprisings in Poland and Hungary coincidently would be a rather hard test of Soviet power。 Khrushchev’s concern over military use was expressed in a meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party held on 24 October， saying that ‘finding a reason for an armed conflict with Poland now would be very easy， but finding a way to put an end to such a conflict later on would be very hard’。［9］ Gomulka， on the other hand， on 23 and 24 October dramatically promised the Polish loyalty to Soviet Union and the membership in Warsaw Pact but continued to press for the removal of Rokossowski。 Soon in return Khrushchev reluctantly accepted the ouster of Rokossowski as a compromise。

10月23日匈牙利出現的危機進一步使情況變得複雜。對蘇聯來說，應對波蘭和匈牙利的兩次大規模起義是對蘇聯實力的一次相當嚴峻的考驗。在10月24日舉行的蘇共主席團會議上，赫魯曉夫表達了對軍事用途的擔憂，稱“現在很容易找到與波蘭發生武裝衝突的理由，但很難找到結束此類衝突的方法”。［9］

另一方面，戈穆爾卡在10月23日和24日戲劇性地承諾波蘭效忠蘇聯和加入華約，但繼續敦促解除內閣親蘇派成員羅科索夫斯基的職務。作為迴應，赫魯曉夫很快不情願地妥協並接受了羅科索夫斯基的解職。

Gomulka’s in-time promise of obedience indicated the effectiveness of Soviet pressure of potential military intervention， however， Khrushchev’s compromise was largely related to his concern of the limits of Soviet power。 The imperfect confidence on easily dealing with two overlapped mass riots served as a part， and if contextualizing the Polish crisis in 1956， we could find more sources of Khrushchev’s concerns。 Rothschild argued that Soviets feared military force against Poland would negatively affect Soviet reconciliation with Tito。［10］ Moreover， Chinese officials’ support of Gomulka and objection to Soviet intervention also restricted Soviet decision-making。 Here we did not see an exercise of infinite Soviet power， but one enmeshed in a network of various concerns which restricted the free exercise of it。 Nevertheless， asserting the prospect that Warsaw Pact would give way to Finlandization of Eastern Europe was an underestimation of Soviet determination on maintaining its hegemony over the Eastern bloc， which the Soviet action in Hungary crisis clearly demonstrated。 ［11］

戈穆爾卡及時做出的服從承諾表明了蘇聯潛在軍事幹預壓力的有效性，然而，赫魯曉夫的妥協在很大程度上與他對蘇聯權力限制的擔憂有關。對輕鬆處理兩次重疊的大規模騷亂的信心缺乏是其中的一部分，如果將1956年的波蘭危機放在國際大背景下，我們可以找到赫魯曉夫的擔憂的更多來源。比如，羅斯柴爾德認為，蘇聯擔心對波蘭的軍事力量會對蘇聯與南斯拉夫鐵托當局的和解產生負面影響。［10］

此外，中國官員對戈穆爾卡的支援和對蘇聯干預的反對也限制了蘇聯的決策。在這裡，我們沒有看到蘇聯行使無限的權力，而是陷入了各種各樣的關切網路，並由此限制了其自由行使權力。然而，斷言華約會讓允許東歐芬蘭化，是低估了蘇聯維持其對東歐集團霸權的決心，蘇聯在匈牙利危機中的行動清楚地表明瞭這一點。

Following Poland’s lead and encouraged by US propaganda promoting the ‘liberalization’ of ‘captive people’， latent discontent in Hungary erupted into large-scale uprising in October 1956。 The re-ascendance of Rakosi in 1955-56 under the ‘friendly interference’ from Khrushchev-led CPSU brought the grievances toward Radoki’s fundamentally incorrect governance， and his reassertion of Stalinism under the context of de-Stalinization made him the least welcomed in HWP Central Leadership， which finally led to his replacement by Erno Gero， still under the Soviet ‘advice’ from Mikoyan。［12］

在波蘭的示範效應引導，在美國宣傳推動“俘虜自由化”的鼓動下，匈牙利的潛在不滿情緒在1956年10月爆發為大規模起義。1955年至1956年，拉科西在赫魯曉夫領導的蘇共的“友好乾涉”下重新崛起，人們對拉多基的低效治理感到不滿，他在去斯大林化的背景下重申斯大林主義，這使他在HWP中央領導層中最不受歡迎，最終被格羅·埃諾取代，當然，這仍然是在蘇高階領導阿納斯塔斯·米高揚的“建議”下執行的。［12］

Yet Gero’s effort to restore Hungary was in little effect。 On 23 October， student demonstration surged to a mass unrest and arrival of Soviet troop on the next day further irritated the public。 The Soviet leadership in the meantime sent a delegation consisting of members including A。I。 Mikoyan and M。A。 Suslov， delivering possible Soviet concessions such as approving an incorporation of non-communists to join the government， but also warned that any further concession might cause the overthrow of communist system。 There was a moment very close to peace that the decision was made on 28 October to withdraw all Soviet troop and support the new Nagy government。 Yet in following days as circumstances changed， the non-interventionist momentum was reversed。 The reason for this shift， has been discussed much， it seemed more convincing that Soviet was concerned that Hungarian crisis might spread to other Eastern European countries and could affect the entire bloc， and Nagy’s declaration to remove Hungary from Warsaw Pact added fuel to fire but the revision’s link to Suez Crisis was weak。［13］ The crisis of Hungary ended with Soviet military action finally， with more than 25000 people killed and 200000 fled。［14］

格羅·埃諾恢復匈牙利的努力收效甚微。10月23日，學生示威引發大規模騷亂，第二天蘇聯軍隊的到來進一步激怒了公眾。與此同時，蘇聯領導層派出了一個由包括阿納斯塔斯·米高揚和米哈伊爾·安德烈耶維奇·蘇斯洛夫在內的成員組成的代表團，提出了蘇聯可能做出的讓步，如批准非共產主義者加入內閣，但也警告說，任何進一步的讓步都可能導致共產主義制度的推翻。10月28日做出決定，撤出所有蘇聯軍隊，支援新的納吉·伊姆雷內閣，這是一個非常接近和平的時刻。

然而在接下來的幾天裡，隨著形勢的變化，不干涉主義的勢頭髮生了逆轉。這種轉變的原因已經被討論了很多，比較令人信服的研究結論是，蘇聯擔心匈牙利危機可能會蔓延到其他東歐國家，並可能影響整個歐洲，而納吉·伊姆雷宣佈將匈牙利從華約中除名，這更是火上澆油，但需要指出這一修訂與蘇伊士危機的聯絡很弱。［13］ 匈牙利危機最終以蘇聯的軍事行動結束，25000多人死亡，20萬人逃離。

In both events in Poland and in Hungary， China’ role is of particular interest， demonstrating its ambition to challenge the centrality of the Soviet Union in the Communist camp。 One year prior to 1956， China raised its ‘five principle of coexistence’ in Bandung conference which was in high contrast to the idea in Warsaw Pact。 Beijing’s pursuit of an elusive equality， according to Chen Jian， reflected a ‘Chinese mentality of superiority’ which helped to establish its own prestige in rival with the Soviet one。［15］ On watching the crisis emerging in Poland， Mao commented its roots were in Moscow’s ‘big power chauvinism’ and he further commented that ‘when the son fails to obey， the rude father picks up a stick to beat him’ and Soviet intervention on Poland was a violation of the fundamental norm of international relations。［16］ The Chinese officials on October 23 discussion on the crisis in Poland and later in Hungary， suggested that Soviet should seek ‘peaceful coexistence’ with and ‘more equal approach’ to Eastern European countries， though later turned-out ‘counterrevolutionary’ nature of Hungary uprising led the Chinese reverse their assessment of the crisis。［17］ After the Soviet invasion of Hungary， Zhou Enlai ‘lectured’ Khrushchev on Soviet mistake that Kremlin decision-decision making was in short of political maturity and sophistication。 Khrushchev， in need of Mao’s friendship， ‘caved into Zhou’s criticism’ and tolerated the new Chinese role。［18］ The Soviet-Chinese direct and indirect interactions displayed Mao and his fellows strong consciousness of China’s centrality in the world proletarian revolution and a relatively， slightly weaker portrait of Khrushchev， in his position in 1956。

在波蘭和匈牙利的這兩個事件中，中國的作用尤其令人感興趣，這表明了它挑戰蘇聯在共產主義陣營中中心地位的雄心。1956年前一年，中國在萬隆會議上提出了“共處五項原則”，這與華約中的理念形成了鮮明對比。陳兼說，北京追求一種難以捉摸的平等，反映了一種“中國的優越性”，這種心態有助於在與蘇聯的競爭中建立自己的威望。［15］

在觀察波蘭出現的危機時，毛評論說，危機的根源在於莫斯科的“大國沙文主義”，他進一步評論說，“當兒子不服從時，粗魯的父親拿起棍子打他”，蘇聯對波蘭的干預違反了國際關係的基本準則。［16］ 10月23日，中國官員在討論波蘭危機和後來在匈牙利的危機時，建議蘇聯尋求與東歐國家“和平共處”，並對東歐國家採取“更平等的態度”，儘管後來發現匈牙利起義的“反革命”性質導致中國人改變了對危機的評估。［17］ 蘇聯入侵匈牙利後，周總“教導”赫魯曉夫蘇聯的錯誤，即克里姆林宮的決策缺乏政治成熟度和成熟度。赫魯曉夫需要毛的友誼，“屈服於周的批評”，並容忍了中國的新角色。［18］ 蘇聯與中國的直接和間接互動顯示了毛及其同僚對中國在世界無產階級革命中的中心地位的強烈意識，以及1956年赫魯曉夫的相對較弱的形象。

North Korea also had its 1956。 Khrushchev’s secret speech and the post-Stalin liberalism promoted some North Korean including party cadres， intellectuals and student to openly rebel their national leader Kim II Song which turned to a leadership crisis， later known as the ‘August Events’。 Yet Kim II Song and his camp survived this challenge by his own without introducing intervention from China and Soviet Union。 This failure of overthrow and an abortive Soviet-Chinese intervention demonstrated that Kim II Song had consolidated his position and was no longer the puppet of foreign power。 The dramatic August Event accelerated Kim II Song’s process of getting rid of some Soviet style policies that had been imposed on his country， and establishing Socialist state with notable North Korean characteristics。 Eventually these changes led to fanatical personality cult and then the

chuch’e’

’s replacing Marxism as the orthodoxy ideology of North Korea。 Kim’s success of power-seeking from the Soviet ‘big brother’ and gradual refusal of Marxism demonstrates the incoherency of Communist bloc and incompetence of the Soviet Union maintaining its influence in regardless of geographic distance。 ［19］

朝鮮也有它獨特的1956年。赫魯曉夫的秘密演講和後斯大林時代的自由主義促使一些朝鮮人，包括幹部、知識分子和學生公開反抗他們的國家領導人金氏，這導致了一場領導危機，後來被稱為“八月事件”。然而，金日成及其陣營在沒有引入中國和蘇聯干預的情況下獨自經受住了這一挑戰。推翻的失敗和蘇中干預的失敗表明，金日成鞏固了自己的地位，而不再是外國勢力的傀儡。

戲劇性的八月事件加速了金日成擺脫強加給他的國家的一些蘇聯式政策，並建立具有顯著朝鮮特色的社會主義國家的程序。最終，這些變化導致了狂熱的個人崇拜，然後主體思想取代馬克思主義成為朝鮮的正統意識形態。金正恩成功地向蘇聯“老大哥”尋求權力，並逐漸拒絕馬克思主義，這表明共產主義集團的不連貫性，以及蘇聯在不考慮地理距離的情況下維持其影響力的無能。［19］

Although crisis in Poland and Hungary put threats to Soviet-led order and the rise of China and North Korea further eroded its centrality and prestige， it has to be cautious to underestimate the Soviet power， particularly in East Europe。 From one perspective， both crisis were settled by the Soviets， no matter through reciprocal compromise or use of violence， from the other perspective， the Western power particularly the US’ reactions to Hungary crisis， also proved that Soviet maintained its role in Eastern Europe。 Before the crisis emerged， the US propaganda had consistently disseminated the value of Eastern Europe liberation。 But when faced with Hungary’s suffering and Nagy’s urgent request for military assistance from the West in particular the US， Eisenhower administration held acquiescence， in a fear of irritating the Soviets and potential nuclear war。［20］ The inaction proved the hypocrisy pf Eisenhower’s rollback policy and also， an acknowledgement of Soviet power and its sphere of influence。 The fate of Eastern Europe depended far more on the Soviet Union than on the others。 Such dependence could be reflected from numerous parts of Soviet-Eastern European interactions， from political arrangements such as Soviet leadership appointment for the Eastern European counterparts， and so on。 They all contribute to a hard fact that since 1956， for the next 33 years， Eastern Europe was still within the Soviet Union‘s sphere。 Yet China and North Korea seemed to achieved what they expected by gradually seek power from the Soviet and continuing to do so， which accumulated to the Sino-split in 1961 and the rise of Kim’s dynasty in North Korea。

儘管波蘭和匈牙利的危機對蘇聯領導的秩序構成了威脅，中國和朝鮮的崛起進一步削弱了它的中心地位和威望，但我們不必低估蘇聯的力量，尤其是在東歐。從一個角度看，這兩次危機都是由蘇聯解決的，無論是透過相互妥協還是使用暴力，從另一個角度看，西方大國特別是美國對匈牙利危機的反應也證明了蘇聯在東歐保持了其作用。在危機出現之前，美國的宣傳一直在傳播東歐解放的價值觀。但面對匈牙利的苦難和納吉向西方特別是美國提出的緊急軍事援助請求，艾森豪威爾持沉默態度，以避免激怒蘇聯和誘發核戰爭。［20］ 這種不作為證明了艾森豪威爾的綏靖政策的虛偽性，也證明了美對蘇聯權力及其勢力範圍的承認。

東歐的命運更多地取決於蘇聯，而不是其他國家。這種依賴性可以從蘇聯與東歐互動的許多方面反映出來，也可以從政治安排中反映出來，比如蘇聯任命東歐領導人等等。它們都促成了一個殘酷的事實，即自1956年以來，在接下來的33年裡，東歐仍在蘇聯的管轄範圍內。然而，中國和朝鮮似乎實現了他們的預期，他們逐步從蘇聯尋求奪取權力，並繼續這樣做，這累積到1961年的中蘇分裂並推動了金王朝在朝鮮的崛起。

［1］ Brend Stover， Eastern Europe， in Richard H。 Immerman and Petra Goedde， eds。，

The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War

（Oxford： Oxford University Press， 2013）， p。422 。

［2］ Geoff Eley， Forging Democracy： The History of the Left in Europe， 1850-2000 （Oxford： Oxford University Press， 2002）， 330， cited in Philipp Gassert， Internal Challenges to the Cold War： Oppositional Movements East and West， in Richard H。 Immerman and Petra Goedde， eds。，

The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War

（Oxford： Oxford University Press， 2013）， p。439。

［3］ Krushchev warned the delegates that did not let this ‘get out of the Party， especially not to the presses’。 Nevertheless， his criticism was disseminated， partly under Krushchev’s support， to an extent that ‘the criticism was being read out loud in all kinds of places…including school audiences of fourteen-year-olds。’ Paweł Machcewicz。

Rebellious Satellite： Poland， 1956。

（Stanford： Stanford University Press， 2009）， pp。18-19。

［4］ Machcewicz， p。45

［5］ Archie Brown。

The Rise and Fall of Communism

。 （New York： Vintage Publishing， 2010）， p。277

［6］ See the Soviet Commander’s influence on Polish army， in Mark Kramer， The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland： Reassessments and New Findings。

Journal of Contemporary History

33， no。 2 （1998）， 168。

［7］ Brown， p。277

［8］ Kramer， pp。171-172

［9］ ‘Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24。 Rijna 1956’， L。8， cited in Kramer， p。172

［10］ Joseph Rothschild。

Return to Diversity： A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II

。 （Oxford： Oxford University Press， 1989）， p。153

［11］ Gregory Mitrovich

。 Undermining the Kremlin： America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc， 1947-1956

。 （New York： Cornell University Press， 2000）， p。169

［12］ Johanna Granville ”Poland and Hungary， 1956： a Comparative Essay Based on New Archival Findings。“

Australian Journal of Politics & History

48， no。 3 （2002）： 375。 For Soviet CPSU deciding Poland leader， also in Kramer， p177

［13］ Brown， p。283； Vladislav Zubok

A Failed Empire： the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev

。 （Chapel Hill： University of North Carolina Press， 2009）， p。117； John Young and Kent John。

International Relations since 1945。

（Oxford： Oxford University Press， 2013）。 P。137

［14］ Young & John， p。138

［15］ Chen Jian，

Mao‘s China and the Cold War

。 （Chapel Hill： University of North Carolina Press， 2010）。 P。43

［16］ Chen， p。147

［17］ Zubok， p。116

［18］ Zubok， p。118

［19］ Andrei Lankov has made his exclusive contribution to the research on de-Stalinization in North Korea。， particularly through his publication，

Crisis in North Korea： The Failure of De-Stalinization， 1956

。 （Hawaii： University of Hawaii Press， 2007）。

［20］ Csaba Bekes。 The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Great Powers。

The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

13， no。 2 （1997）： 56